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We thoroughly analyse the novel quantum key distribution protocol introduced recently in
quant-ph/0412075, which is based on minimal qubit tomography. We examine the efficiency of
the protocol for a whole range of noise parameters and present a general analysis of incoherent
eavesdropping attacks with arbitrarily many steps in the iterative key generation process. The com-
parison with the tomographic 6-state protocol shows that our protocol has a higher efficiency (up
to 20%) and ensures the security of the established key even for noise parameters far beyond the
6-state protocol’s noise threshold.
PACS numbers:
A. Introduction
With the growing interest in quantum information the-
ory, quantum cryptography has become a key research
area. One way of ensuring secure communication is to
establish a secret key between the two communication
partners, Alice and Bob, with which they can later encode
and decode secret messages. The distribution of the key
can be done using quantum mechanical systems where
the laws of physics guarantee the security, in marked
contrast to classical schemes which rely on the complex-
ity of mathematical problems. Quantum key distribu-
tion could thus replace conventional public key cryptosys-
tems, which can be broken in polynomial time by quan-
tum algorithms as soon as suitable quantum computers
are available.
Most quantum key distribution schemes discussed at
the current stage of research are based on the BB84 [1]
or the E91 [2] protocol. These schemes operate in only a
subspace of the whole qubit state space, and so they al-
low the eavesdropper, Eve, unnecessary freedom to make
use of the undetected portion of the Hilbert space. This
power is denied to her in fully tomographic key distribu-
tion protocols, such as those of Ref. [3], and in particular
by the “minimal qubit tomography protocol” of Ref. [4]
that has become known colloquially as the Singapore pro-
tocol. It relies heavily on the minimal qubit tomography
(MQT) discussed in Ref. [5]
In Ref. [4] it was shown that the maximum theoretical
efficiency of a quantum key distribution protocol using
the MQT measurement is maximally log2
4
3 = 0.415; this
is less than the efficiencies of the non-tomographic BB84
and E91 protocol which are 12 and
2
9 , respectively. How-
ever, the difference between the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob (A&B) and the mutual information
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between Eve and either Alice or Bob (CK-yield) promises
to be higher than in the non-tomographic protocols [6].
Moreover, the MQT measurement has the potential for
a significantly higher key yield than the comparable to-
mographic 6-state protocol introduced in Ref. [9] and dis-
cussed in Refs. [7, 10], which has an efficiency of only 13 .
Using the MQTmeasurement, one possible way to gen-
erate a secret key from the correlated measurement out-
comes was proposed in Ref. [4]. The resulting quantum
key distribution protocol recovers 0.4 key-bits per qubit
pair, or 96.4% of the potential efficiency in the noise-free
case. It is the objective of the present paper to give a
detailed account of how the analysis is carried out that
yields the thresholds stated in Ref. [4]. A quantum key-
distribution scheme that uses POVMs with tetrahedron
structure is also investigated by Renes in Ref. [11]. This
protocol differs from the Singapore protocol by a less effi-
cient key generation procedure that does not fully exploit
the potential of the MQT measurement.
In Sec. B we give a brief overview of the MQTmeasure-
ment and review the key generation in Sec. C. In Sec. D
we will discuss the constraints on Eve’s eavesdropping
imposed by the tomographic nature of the MQT mea-
surement. We then investigate, in Sec. E, the incoher-
ent attacks available to Eve when she exploits the classi-
cal information transmitted between the communication
partners during the key generation. Finally, in Sec. F we
examine the security of the protocol against such attacks
and obtain the noise threshold stated in Ref. [4].
B. Minimal qubit tomography
We suppose Alice and Bob want to establish a secret
key and they use a provider that distributes entangled
qubit pairs for private communication. As advertised,
each will receive one qubit of the pair. Since real commu-
nication channels do not usually preserve the signal per-
fectly, Alice and Bob have to deal with the fact that they
will receive a distorted state. Let Alice and Bob agree to
accept only a mixed state ρA&B consisting of the ideal,
2perfectly anti-correlated singlet |s〉〈s| = 14 (1− ~σA · ~σB) ,
and white, unbiased noise, weighted with a noise param-
eter ǫ. The two-qubit state that A&B will share is thus
ρA&B(ǫ) = (1 − ǫ)|s〉〈s|+ ǫ
4
1, (1)
where ǫ ranges from ǫ = 0 (no noise) to ǫ = 1 (nothing
but noise). In practical situations, the class of acceptable
sources should in fact be chosen in accordance with the
experimental setup which produces the singlet and the
properties of the transmission line used (fibre, air, ...).
But for the sake of simplicity, we impose the above stan-
dard criterion which was also used in the tomographic
protocols of Ref. [3].
The tomographically complete 6-state protocol was an-
alyzed for the above scenario in Ref. [12]. In this proto-
col, Alice and Bob each performs a measurement of a
randomly chosen Pauli operator, σx, σy or σz , resulting
in six outcome probabilities. However, this is not a min-
imal tomography since only four outcome probabilities
are needed to specify the state of a qubit completely.
The optimal qubit tomography POVM with the mini-
mum number of four elements is of tetrahedron geometry
as shown in Ref. [5]; that is the POVM operators can be
written in the form
Pk =
1
4
(
1+ ~tk · ~σ
)
for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, (2)
where the vectors ~tk point to the corners of a tetrahedron
inscribed in the Bloch sphere; see Fig. 1 in Ref. [5] for an
illustration. The four vectors are linearly dependent,
4∑
k=1
~tk = 0, (3)
with the scalar product
~tk · ~tl = 4
3
δkl − 1
3
for k, l = 1, 2, 3, 4, (4)
and fulfill the dyadic completeness relation
3
4
4∑
k=1
~tk ~tk = 1
↔
. (5)
Let Alice and Bob each measure the tetrahedron
POVM of Eq. (2) on many copies of a two-qubit state
ρ. The resulting joint probabilities of the measurement
are then given by pkl = tr [ρ Pk Ql], with Pk denoting Al-
ice’s POVM elements and Ql Bob’s, chosen so that their
tetrahedrons are perfectly aligned (if they chose a non-
zero angle between their tetrahedrons they would lose
the perfect anti-correlations introduced by the singlet).
To verify that they indeed received the state ρA&B of
Eq. (1), Alice and Bob sacrifice a fraction of their data
and announce them publicly to determine the joint prob-
abilities pkl of Alice measuring k and Bob l. They check
their results for statistical independence and are able to
reconstruct the original state by
ρ =
4∑
k,l=1
(6Pk − 1) pkl (6Ql − 1). (6)
Naturally, after a finite number of measurements, Al-
ice and Bob cannot infer the values of the pkl exactly,
but they can estimate them rather reliably. A discussion
of the quality of such estimates was given in Ref. [5] for
the single qubit case where it was also shown that the
measurement of a randomly chosen qubit state with the
tetrahedron POVM will on average lead to the best (op-
timal) estimate of the state’s Pauli vector. Finally A&B
compare whether the predicted state of Eq. (6) is consis-
tent with Eq. (1). They will only use the provider if this
is the case.
Given the shared state is ρA&B(ǫ) for some ǫ, their
joint probabilities pkl will be
pkl =
4− ǫ
48
(1− δkl) + ǫ
16
δkl for k, l = 1, 2, 3, 4, (7)
and the accessible information that A&B can establish
between each other is given by
IaccessA&B (ǫ) =
(
1− ǫ
4
)
log2
4− ǫ
3
+
ǫ
4
log2 ǫ, (8)
where we used the definition of the classical mutual in-
formation for a probability distribution {pkl}k,l
I =
∑
kl
pkl log2
pkl∑
k′ pk′l
∑
l′ pkl′
. (9)
Note that in the noise-free case the accessible infor-
mation, IaccessA&B (0) = 0.415, is substantially higher (by
24.5%) than the corresponding value of 13 for the tomo-
graphically complete 6-state protocol.
C. The Singapore protocol
From now on, we will refer to the possible measure-
ment outcomes as A, B, C, D for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, respec-
tively, symbolizing a click in the k-th POVM detector.
To generate a key from their correlated sequences, Al-
ice and Bob have to communicate classically. We use
the two-way key generation scheme proposed in Ref. [4]
which leads to a mutual information of IA&B(0) = 0.4,
sufficiently close to the maximally accessible information
of IaccessA&B (0) = 0.415. The scheme has a simple structure
and can be easily implemented on a computer. We give
a brief description of the key generation scheme followed
by a more detailed analysis considering the presence of
noise which will be relevant for the eavesdropping dis-
cussion. We refer the reader to the original paper [4] for
more details on the key generation scheme.
Let us first consider the noise-free case (ǫ = 0). Alice
publicly announces two randomly chosen positions of her
3Bob’s 2nd letter
A B C D M.P.
A 1
4
p2s
1
4
pspd
1
4
pspd
1
4
pspd
ǫ
16
Bob’s B 1
4
pspd
1
4
p2d
1
4
p2d
1
4
p2d
4−ǫ
48
1st letter C 1
4
pspd
1
4
p2d
1
4
p2d
1
4
p2d
4−ǫ
48
D 1
4
pspd
1
4
p2d
1
4
p2d
1
4
p2d
4−ǫ
48
M.P. ǫ
16
4−ǫ
48
4−ǫ
48
4−ǫ
48
1
4
TABLE I: Bob’s two letters given that Alice announced two
positions where she got the outcome A.
sequence for which she has the same letter. With proba-
bility 23 , Bob has different letters at these positions. He
then groups the possible outcomes A, B, C, D in two
groups, one containing the two letters he received and
one with the remaining two letters. He randomly assigns
the values 0 and 1 to the two groups and announces these
groupings. Bob does not reveal which group his letters
belong to, but since A&B’s measurement outcomes are
perfectly anti-correlated, they can both write down the
value of the group which contains Alice’s letter and thus
generate a key-bit. With probability 13 Bob has the same
letter in the two positions Alice announced. In this case,
he states this fact and A&B each write their correspond-
ing letter in a new sequence. The above procedure is re-
peated iteratively with the new sequences thus generated.
In the presence of noise, the key sequence generated
with the above scheme will contain errors with a rate
dependent on ǫ. For the original letter sequence (first
iteration), the probability of Alice and Bob receiving the
same letter is then non-zero, see Eq. (7),
ps (ǫ) =
ǫ
4
, (10)
and Bob receives one of the other three letters with prob-
ability
pd (ǫ) =
4− ǫ
12
. (11)
With a priori probability 14 Alice announces the positions
of two occurrences of the letter A. Then, Bob’s corre-
sponding two letters occur with the probabilities given in
Table I, where M.P. denotes the marginal probabilities.
The conversion into one key-bit will occur when Bob’s
letters are unequal, i.e. in all off-diagonal cases. Simi-
larly, we can construct the probability tables for Alice’s
other choices of letters. Let us denote the probability of
successfully generating one key-bit from one letter pair
by psucc. For the first iteration it is then
p(1)succ (ǫ) = 6pd (ps + pd) =
(4− ǫ) (2 + ǫ)
12
. (12)
However, these successfully generated key-bits will con-
tain errors. The probability that a generated key-bit is
wrong is given by
p(1)err (ǫ) =
6pspd
p
(1)
succ
=
ps
ps + pd
=
3ǫ
4 + 2ǫ
, (13)
accounting for the equally likely cases that Bob writes 0
and Alice 1 and vice versa. The mutual information of
the key itself is thus less than unity and depends on p
(1)
err ,
which is nonzero for nonzero ǫ,
Ikey
(
p(1)err
)
= 1 + p(1)err log2 p
(1)
err (14)
+(1− p(1)err) log2
[
1− p(1)err
]
.
Let us regard the mutual information as a cryptographic
resource that Alice and Bob can use later to extract a per-
fectly correlated key. We are therefore interested in the
expectation value of the mutual information which A&B
share per qubit pair. This expectation value is the prod-
uct of the mutual information of the generated key-bit
and the probability that this key-bit was actually gener-
ated (p
(1)
succ), divided by the number of qubit pairs needed
(2 in the first iteration) to obtain the key-bit.
I
(1)
A&B(ǫ) =
p
(1)
succ
2
Ikey
(
p(1)err
)
(15)
=
(4− ǫ)
48
(
(4− ǫ) log2 4− ǫ
2 + ǫ
+ 3ǫ log2
3ǫ
2 + ǫ
)
.
To deduce similar results for further iterations we first
study the properties of the recycled sequences. The sec-
ond iteration can again be characterized by two probabil-
ities p′s and p
′
d defined with analogous meanings as ps and
pd for the original sequence. The probability p
′
s is given
by the probability of Bob receiving the same letter as
Alice in the original sequence twice
(
ps
2
)
, divided by the
total probability of keeping letters in the first iteration,
i.e. failure in generating a key-bit,
(
1− p(1)succ
)
,
p′s =
(
ǫ
4
)2(
ǫ
4
)2
+ 3
(
4−ǫ
12
)2 . (16)
Similarly, p′d is given by
p′d =
(
4−ǫ
12
)2(
ǫ
4
)2
+ 3
(
4−ǫ
12
)2 = 1− p′s3 . (17)
Upon defining ǫ′ in accordance with p′s =
ǫ′
4 and p
′
d =
4−ǫ′
12 , we can carry the analysis for the first iteration over
to the next iteration by replacing ǫ by ǫ′. The relation
between ǫ′ and ǫ is most compactly stated in the form
3ǫ′
4− ǫ′ =
(
3ǫ
4− ǫ
)2
, (18)
showing that the noise reduces quadratically with each
iteration step. All further iterations can thus be analyzed
4in the same way, each time replacing the noise ǫ of the
previous iteration by the new noise parameter ǫ′.
In particular, the probability of successfully generating
a key-bit in the n-th iteration is, similarly to Eq. (12),
given by q(n) =
(
4− ǫ(n)) (2 + ǫ(n)) /12, where ǫ(n) de-
notes the noise parameter in the n-th iteration. The con-
ditional probability p
(n)
succ of a key-bit being generated in
the n-th iteration, after failure in the previous n − 1 it-
erations is then given by
p(n)succ = q
(n)
n−1∏
m=1
(
1− q(m)
)
. (19)
The error probability per key-bit p
(n)
err for the n-th itera-
tion can easily be written as
p(n)err =
3ǫ(n)
4 + 2ǫ(n)
=
[
1 +
(
4− ǫ
3ǫ
)2n−1]−1
, (20)
which uses Eq. (18). The contribution to ItotalA&B in the n-
th iteration is given by I
(n)
A&B(ǫ) = 2
−n p
(n)
succ Ikey
(
p
(n)
err
)
,
and the overall expectation value of the mutual informa-
tion per qubit pair in the limit of infinitely many itera-
tions is thus
ItotalA&B(ǫ) =
∞∑
n=1
p
(n)
succ
2n
Ikey
(
p(n)err
)
. (21)
This quantity serves as our figure of merit for the com-
parison with the 6-state protocol. One should however
keep in mind that it is an average over the various key-
bit sequences of the successive iterations. Each of them
has different noise properties which must be taken into
account when the data are processed further by a privacy
amplification procedure.
In the noiseless case (ǫ = 0), the Singapore protocol
yields a mutual information I
(1)
A&B(0) =
1
3 for the first
iteration. This is as much as one can get in the 6-state
protocol; but here we can improve the efficiency by con-
tinuing the key generation with the left-over sequences,
e.g. I
(1)
A&B(0) + I
(2)
A&B(0) =
1
3 +
1
18 = 0.389 up to the sec-
ond iteration and so on, with the limiting value of 0.4.
When Alice and Bob share the complete mixture (ǫ = 1)
we find the expected result of ItotalA&B(1) ∝ log2 [1] = 0.
The numerical plots of the total mutual information for
Alice and Bob when terminating the key generation af-
ter one, two, ..., five iterations are shown in Fig. 1. The
comparison with the 6-state protocol shows that the mu-
tual information obtained in the Singapore protocol is
larger from the third iteration onwards. Alice and Bob
do not need to perform more than three key-generation
iterations as the third iteration already comes so close to
the limiting value that the benefit of further iterations
will be less then 0.01%. The total gain compared to the
6-state protocol is ∆IA&B = 0.066 or 20% in the noise-
less case and vanishes for ǫ ≥ 23 , when ρA&B of Eq. (1)
FIG. 1: Total mutual information between Alice and Bob
for the Singapore protocol for the 1st to 5th iteration in
comparison with the tomographic 6-state protocol. The
plotted average mutual information of Alice and Bob in
the 6-state protocol represents the function I6-stateA&B (ǫ) =
1
6
(ǫ log2 ǫ+ (2− ǫ) log2 [2− ǫ]) . Note, that the total mutual
information up to the 3rd, 4th and 5th iteration are so close
that they overlap and the 3rd iteration is already a very good
approximation of ItotalA&B. The plot covers the range 0 < ǫ <
2
3
,
i.e., the ǫ-values for which ρA&B of Eq. (1) is not separable.
is separable. This larger efficiency is expected since the
Singapore protocol is minimally tomographic and does
not waste as much information as the 6-state protocol.
Our first conclusion is, therefore, that the Singapore
protocol is considerably more efficient than its obvious
competitor, the tomographic 6-state protocol, and offers
an alternative way for establishing a secret key between
the communication partners. We will now discuss pos-
sible incoherent eavesdropping attacks on the Singapore
protocol and find the noise thresholds below which the
security of the protocol is guaranteed.
D. Constraints on Eve’s eavesdropping
In Sec. B Alice and Bob received a two-qubit state
sent by a provider. We must however assume that this
provider is not trustworthy and eager to know A&B’s
secret. We hence identify the provider as the most dan-
gerous eavesdropper (Eve) possible, and give her full con-
trol over the source. In the worst case scenario, Eve is
smarter with her technology and can even replace the
usually noisy channel between Alice and Bob by a perfect
one. She is then in the position to entangle an additional
ancilla to each qubit pair she sends, and the disturbances
she causes by doing so would imitate noise. But Alice
and Bob perform a complete tomography of the shared
state and since they agree to use the channel only when
the noise has the properties reflected in Eq. (1), they can
greatly restrict how Eve can entangle ancillas, and later
on deduce the shared key.
Eve will prepare a 3-party pure state because she has
5no advantage from creating a mixed state and thus intro-
ducing classical noise herself. We decompose the state as
|Sǫ〉 =
4∑
l=1
|ll¯〉|El〉, (22)
where the (unnormalized) states |El〉 represent Eve’s an-
cilla. The pure states |ll¯〉 belong to Alice and Bob and
form a non-orthogonal basis {|ll¯〉}4l=1, where the tetrahe-
dron states |l〉 and |l¯〉 are defined as
|l〉〈l| = 1
2
(
1+ ~tl · ~σ
)
,
|l¯〉〈l¯| = 1
2
(
1− ~tl · ~σ
)
,
l = 1, 2, 3, 4, (23)
with the phase-conventions
〈l|k〉 = 〈k¯|l¯〉 and 〈l|k¯〉 = −〈k|l¯〉, (24)
the second of which implied by the first. Some useful rela-
tions of these states can be found in the Appendix. Note,
that the decomposition of Eq. (22) allows for exactly four
components on Eve’s side, together forming Eve’s ancilla
state. Each ancilla can thus be represented by a maxi-
mally four-dimensional system so that the ancilla can be
regarded as another qubit pair.
Eve’s ancilla state is however restricted by the condi-
tion that A&B must receive the two-qubit state ρA&B of
Eq. (1) which they check by comparing their outcomes
of the tomographic measurement. Assuming that all the
noise originates in Eve’s eavesdropping attempt, the 3-
party state |Sǫ〉 must be such that
tr Eve [|Sǫ〉〈Sǫ|] = ρA&B(ǫ). (25)
Let us rewrite ρA&B using the expansion of the identity
matrix in Eq. (A5) and the decomposition of the singlet
in Eq. (A3), to get
ρA&B(ǫ) =
1
8
4∑
l,k=1
|ll¯〉〈kk¯|
(
1− 3
2
ǫ+ 3ǫδlk
)
. (26)
This expression immediately gives the following con-
straints on Eve’s ancilla state
〈Ek|El〉 = 2− 3ǫ
16
+
3ǫ
8
δkl for k, l = 1, ..., 4. (27)
For ǫ = 0, the |El〉 are identical and Eve cannot ex-
tract any information. For ǫ = 23 , the scalar products in
Eq. (27) show the orthogonality of the |El〉 which implies
that ρA&B is separable. Indeed, Alice and Bob share a
separable Werner state
ρA&B
(
2
3
)
=
1
4
4∑
l=1
|ll¯〉〈ll¯| = 1
4
(
1− 1
3
~σA · ~σB
)
, (28)
and thus all correlations are classical.
In Ref. [13] it was shown that, given the constraints of
Eq. (27), the most general state Eve can construct, up to
unitary equivalence, can be written as
|Sǫ〉 = α|s12〉|s34〉+ β|s13〉|s24〉, (29)
where the first qubit is held by Alice, the second by Bob
and the third and fourth by Eve. The amplitudes α
and β must now be chosen so that Eve’s ancilla satisfies
Eq. (27). By using Eq. (22) and Eq. (29) we find Eve’s
states to be
|Ek〉 = α 1
2
√
2
|s〉 − β
2
(
|k¯k〉+ 1
2
|kk¯〉
)
, (30)
and evaluating the scalar products 〈Ek|El〉 and compar-
ing with Eq. (27) we deduce the constraints on the pa-
rameters α and β,
|β|2 = ǫ and
∣∣∣∣α+ β2
∣∣∣∣
2
= 1− 3
4
ǫ. (31)
Since we have a freedom of global phase for |Sǫ〉 we can
choose β to be real, i.e. β =
√
ǫ. The only free parameter
is then the phase φ in
α+
β
2
= eiφ
√
1− 3ǫ
4
. (32)
Eve wants to guess Alice’s key-bit and constructs a
state ρ
(k)
E for each outcome k Alice could measure re-
gardless of Bob’s result. These conditional ancilla states
are
ρ
(k)
E = trA&B [Pk |Sǫ〉〈Sǫ|] , (33)
=
|β|2
8
|k¯k¯〉〈k¯k¯|
+
1
4
(
α|s〉 − β√
2
|k¯k〉
)(
α∗〈s| − β
∗
√
2
〈k¯k|
)
,
where Pk is the POVM element for Alice measuring k.
Note, that all ρkE are subnormalized to
1
4 , the a priori
probability that Alice will measure a particular k.
Owing to the symmetry between Alice and Bob, the
ancilla states conditional to Bob’s measurement results
are unitarily equivalent to these ρ
(k)
E . Therefore, it does
not matter whether Eve tries to learn Alice’s measure-
ment results or Bob’s.
E. Incoherent Eavesdropping attacks
Let us summarize what we have found so far. For each
qubit pair that Eve sends to A&B she will keep a qubit
pair (the ancilla) for herself. In the first iteration of the
key generation scheme Alice and Bob will use the mea-
surement outcomes of two qubit pairs. Eve has thus two
corresponding ancillas which she can measure to guess
A&B’s generated key-bit. For the second iteration Eve
6will have four, for the third she will have eight ancillas
and so on.
We suppose Eve has no means of storing her ancillas
until classical communication between Alice and Bob is
done. She therefore has to measure them individually as
she creates them, without being able to include the clas-
sical information in her measurement. Her measurement
can be optimized such as to maximize her mutual infor-
mation with Alice. We will call her optimal strategy for
doing this an incoherent attack as opposed to a coherent
(joint) measurement performed on the bunch of ancillas
correlated through the key generation process. The op-
timal POVM for the ρ
(k)
E of Eq. (33) was found using the
iterative procedure in Ref. [12] and is analogous to the
optimal POVM for the 6-state protocol given there. The
4-member POVM consists of the projectors
Ml = |el〉〈el|,
|el〉 = 1 +
√
3e−iφ
2
|s〉+
√
3
2
e−iφ|l¯l〉, (34)
for l = 1, 2, 3, 4, where φ is the phase of Eq. (32), and
the Ml obey
∑4
l=1 Ml = 1. Note that the POVM is
independent of the noise parameter, ǫ.
Interestingly, in the interval 0 < ǫ < ǫ¯ where ǫ¯ =
0.1725 (obtained numerically by solving a transcendental
equation), it was found that a 5-member POVM gives
a slightly larger mutual information then the 4-member
POVM (less than 1% larger). The fifth element has the
following expression
M5 = |e5〉〈e5| where |e5〉 =
√
2µ− 4µ2
4∑
l=1
|el〉(35)
where µ is a function of ǫ and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1/2. All the other
{|el〉}4l=1 have to be modified in the following manner
|ej〉 →
(
|ej〉 − µ
4∑
l=1
|el〉
)
(36)
to ensure the elements sum up to identity. For the pur-
pose of finding the noise threshold, we can just use the
simpler 4-member POVM since as we shall see later, the
noise threshold is always much larger than ǫ¯ for any iter-
ation.
With the 4-member POVM, the joint probabilities qkl
of Alice measuring k and Eve measuring l are given by
the same expression as Alice and Bob’s joint probabili-
ties in Eq. (7) with ǫ replaced by a new noise parameter
η,quantifying the noise between Alice and Eve, with
η(ǫ) =
(√
1− 3ǫ
4
−
√
3ǫ
4
)2
. (37)
Note that for ǫ = 0 the noise between Alice and Eve
reaches a maximum (η = 1) and when ǫ = 23 there is no
noise between Alice and Eve (η = 0).
Eve’s combinations
AA AB AC, AD CD CC
BB BA CA, DA DC DD
BC, BD
CB, DB M.P.
Alice’s 0
q2
s
+q2
d
4
qsqd
2
qd(qs+qd)
4
q2
d
2
q2
d
2
1/2
key-bit 1
q2
d
2
q2
d
2
qd(qd+qs)
4
qsqd
2
q2
d
+q2
s
4
1/2
M.P. X Y Y Y X 1
TABLE II: Joint probabilities between Alice and Eve with the
marginals X =
(
q2s + 3q
2
d
)
/4 and Y = qd(qd + qs)/2, for the
grouping AB = 0 and CD =1.
We define the probabilities qs (qd) for Alice and Eve
having the same (a particular different) measurement re-
sult in analogy to the ps (pd) in Eq. (10) (Eq. (11)) by
qs(η) = qkk =
η
4
and qd(η) = qk 6=l =
4− η
12
. (38)
When a key-bit is generated between Alice and Bob the
joint probabilities between Alice’s and Eve’s results are
as given in Table II where we assumed that Bob grouped
AB = 0 and CD = 1 (similarly for other groupings).
Note, that the probabilities in Table II are again more
anti-correlated than they are correlated since qs ≤ qd
for all η. We compute the mutual information between
Alice and Eve from this table of probabilities. The middle
column does not contribute and the mutual information
becomes
I
(1)
A&E(ǫ) =
p
(1)
succ
2
{
(q2s + q
2
d) log2
[
q2s + q
2
d
2
]
+ 4q2d log2
[
q2d
]
+ 2qsqd log2 [qsqd]
− (q2s + 3q2d) log2
[
q2s + 3q
2
d
4
]
(39)
− 2qd(qs + qd) log2
[
qd(qs + qd)
2
]}
.
where the prefactor is the same as in Eq. (15). This value
gives the upper bound to the amount of information Eve
can obtain about the key generated in the first iteration.
It is valid for incoherent attacks only, by whatever suit-
able method Eve might employ to extract Alice’s key-bit.
In the n-th iteration Eve will have 2n qubit pairs avail-
able for measurement. She measures all qubit pairs indi-
vidually and gets a sequence of 2n letters with A, B, C
and D occurring nA, nB, nC and nD = 2
n−nA−nB−nC
times, respectively. In all announced positions which con-
tribute in the key generation of a key-bit, Alice always
has the same letter, say A. The probability of Eve mea-
suring a sequence which contains nA times A is given by,
with qs and qd from Eq. (38),
qAn (nA) =
1
4
qnAs q
2n−nA
d . (40)
7If Bob grouped AB = 0 and CD = 1, say,
the probability of Eve getting a particular distribution
{nA, nB, nC , nD} and Alice having the key-bit 0 is then
q0n(nA, nB, ) = q
A
n (nA) + q
B
n (nB),
=
q2
n
d
4
[(
qs
qd
)nA
+
(
qs
qd
)nB]
. (41)
and similarly for group 1. The marginal probabilities for
Eve getting a distribution {nA, nB, nC , nD} is then
qn(nA, nB, nC , nD) = q
0
n(nA, nB) + q
1
n(nC , nD),
=
q2
n
d
4
D∑
J=A
(
qs
qd
)nJ
. (42)
The number of sequences with a particular distribution
{nA, nB, nC , nD} is(
2n
nA, nB, nC , nD
)
=
2n! δ2n,nA+nB+nC+nD
nA! nB! nC ! nD!
, (43)
and Alice’s marginals qkn for k = 0, 1 turn out correctly
qkn =
∑
nA,nB ,nC ,nD
(
2n
nA, nB, nC , nD
)
qkn(nA, nB, nC , nD)
=
1
2
. (44)
The contribution to the mutual information that Eve
shares with Alice from the n-th iteration can now be
calculated,
I
(n)
A&E(ǫ) =
p
(n)
succ
2n
1∑
k=0
2n∑
nA,nB,nC ,nD=0
×
(
2n
nA, nB, nC , nD
)
qkn(nA, nB, nC , nD)
× log2
[
qkn(nA, nB, nC , nD)
qn(nA, nB, nC , nD) qkn
]
, (45)
where p
(n)
succ is again the probability of success in the n-th
iteration (Eq. (19)) and the factor of 2−n gives the mu-
tual information per qubit pair used. The total mutual
information that Eve can reach if Alice and Bob perform
infinitely many iterations is then
ItotalA&E(ǫ) =
∞∑
n=1
I
(n)
A&E(ǫ). (46)
In the noise-free case the mutual information of Eve van-
ishes ItotalA&E(0) ∝ log2 [1] = 0. This is clear since the
channel between Alice and Bob is perfect and the chan-
nel between Alice and Eve is completely noisy (η = 1).
F. Security
According to the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner Theorem in Ref. [14],
Alice and Bob are able to share a secret key provided
FIG. 2: Yield for the Singapore protocol for the 1st to 5th it-
eration in comparison with the tomographic 6-state protocol.
For the 6-state protocol we used the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Eve obtained in Ref. [12]. The yields for the
3rd, 4th and 5th iteration overlap too, as they did in Fig. 1
and the latter can be regarded as a very close approximation
to the yield in the limit of infinitely many iterations.
their mutual information ItotalA&B exceeds the mutual in-
formations shared between Eve and one of the commu-
nication partners ItotalA&E and I
total
B&E . The CK-yield is then
YCK = I
total
A&B − ItotalA&E . (47)
The CK-yield determines the length of the secure key
Alice and Bob can obtain from the generated raw key
of length L; namely the length of the secure key will
maximally be YCK L (for one-way communication). The
intersection between ItotalA&B and I
total
A&E thus gives the final
noise threshold below which a secret key between Alice
and Bob can be generated by one-way communication
that relies on error correction codes.
In Fig. 2 we plot the CK-yield for the 6-state protocol
and different iterations of the Singapore protocol. Ob-
serve that the yield of the Singapore protocol is distinctly
larger than the yield of the tomographic 6-state protocol
from the second iteration onwards. For ǫ = 0 the gain is
already 20% and it increases significantly for larger noise
parameters. Further, the noise threshold for the first it-
eration of the Singapore protocol is at ǫ = 0.409 and
increases to ǫ = 0.417 for the 3rd iteration. Additional
iterations will raise this value in the 4th decimal place,
so that ǫ = 0.417 can count as the maximum noise Alice
and Bob can accept when establishing a secure key with
the Singapore protocol. In contrast, the 6-state proto-
col has its noise threshold at the much smaller value of
ǫ = 0.236. Compared to the 6-state protocol the noise
threshold of the Singapore protocol is remarkable 76.7%
higher. This result is our key observation in this paper.
Given a number of qubit pairs, measuring the tetrahe-
dron POVM and using the above key-generation scheme
thus leads to a raw key substantially longer than the one
that could be produced by the 6-state protocol. Addi-
8tionally, Alice and Bob are still able to share a secret key
when the noise level exceeds the 6-state threshold by a
lot.
G. Discussion and conclusions
The analysis of the eavesdropping attacks was car-
ried out for the original protocols, without any error-
correction or privacy amplification schemes. It is thus
a comparison between the Singapore protocol and the 6-
state protocol in their pure form only up to the extraction
of a raw key. We have seen the inherent potential of both
protocols and analysed in detail how much mutual infor-
mation the communication partners Alice and Bob can
establish between each other when using the Singapore
protocol. It turns out that A&B can already stop the key
generation after the third iteration without losing much,
since the mutual information up to the third iteration
is already very close to the limiting value of infinitely
many iterations. The comparison with the 6-state proto-
col showed that the efficiency of the Singapore protocol
is up to 20% larger than in the 6-state protocol.
We continued our discussion by constructing incoher-
ent eavesdropping attacks under the following assump-
tions: 1) A source controlled by the eavesdropper Eve
distributes the singlet state, mixed with unbiased, white
noise scaled by the noise parameter ǫ. 2) Eve is the cause
for all noise; and 3) Eve can not store her ancillas and
is thus not able to incorporate knowledge of the classi-
cal communication between Alice and Bob when mea-
suring her ancillas. Additionally she is constrained to
perform only individual attacks and cannot measure cor-
related ancillas in a joint measurement. Condition 1) is
equivalent to the scenario where Alice sends a qubit in
a state orthogonal to one of the tetrahedron states from
Eq. (23), each with probability 14 . Eve could then inter-
cept the traveling qubit and produce an optimal clone
and an anti-clone. Here she also keeps two qubits which
she can measure and Bob receives a disturbed state. To-
gether with condition 2) this leads to the worst case sce-
nario for Alice and Bob, where Eve can realize optimal
cloning. This is reasonable since we are interested in ab-
solute security statements which rely only on the laws
of physics and not on technical abilities of Eve. On the
other hand, we assumed condition 3) which is clearly a
relaxation to this strictness. But this is still a valid con-
straint given that modern technology has not developed
reliable quantum storage systems and it is not yet feasi-
ble to perform joint measurements on demand. However,
we have also analysed coherent eavesdropping attacks on
the Singapore protocol as discussed in Ref. [4] and will
present a detailed and extended report in due time.
Our discussion did assume throughout that Alice and
Bob share a state of the form given in Eq. (1). A natural
and open question is then how well will the Singapore
protocol perform if the state differs from the above, e.g.
if the noise is somehow biased, and how does it then
compare to the 6-state protocol? Another issue worth
addressing is the possible use that Eve can make of the in-
formation gained when Alice and Bob perform a privacy
amplification or key purification by other means. How-
ever, under the conditions 1) - 3), the Singapore protocol
provides an efficient alternative for generating a secret
key between two communication partners. The measure-
ment of the tetrahedron POVM is from a practical point
of view as feasible as the comparable tomographic 6-state
measurement (see Ref. [15]) and the efficiency and secu-
rity under incoherent attacks is significantly higher.
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Appendix
It is expedient to re-express the tetrahedron states of
Eq. (23) in terms of the POVM elements Pl of Eq. (2) by
|l〉〈l| = 2 Pl,
|l¯〉〈l¯| = 1− 2 Pl.
l = 1, 2, 3, 4, (A1)
Then the scalar products of the tetrahedron states are
given by
|〈l|k〉|2 = 4 tr [Pl Pk] = 1
3
(1 + 2δkl),
|〈l|k¯〉|2 = 2 tr [Pl (1− 2Pk)] = 1
3
(2− 2δkl).
(A2)
The singlet |s〉 can be written in terms of the |l〉 and |l¯〉
as
|s〉 = 1√
2
(|ll¯〉 − |l¯l〉) for any l = 1, 2, 3, 4, (A3)
or
|s〉 = 1√
8
4∑
l=1
|ll¯〉 = − 1√
8
4∑
l=1
|l¯l〉. (A4)
Furthermore, we expand the identity in terms of |ll¯〉 and
the singlet,
1 =
3
2
4∑
l=1
|ll¯〉〈ll¯| − 2|s〉〈s|. (A5)
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